A new report from the Совет экономических консультантов (CEA) estimates that the Бюро финансовой защиты потребителей (CFPB) has imposed $237 billion to $369 billion in cumulative costs on U.S. consumers since its creation in 2011, largely through higher borrowing costs.
For 2024 alone, the report estimates $24 billion to $38 billion in costs. The bulk of the total costs since 2011 — $222 billion to $350 billion — comes from higher interest rates on ипотека, auto loans and credit cards.
The analysis also estimates $1.5 billion to $5.7 billion in deadweight losses from fewer loan originations, $13.3 billion in fiscal costs and $21 billion in paperwork burdens since the bureau’s inception.
The отчет argues that these figures exceed the CFPB’s reported figure of $21 billion returned to consumers through enforcement actions.
“Through a combination of regulation, supervision and the persistent threat of enforcement, the CFPB has increased the cost of credit for both lenders and borrowers,” the report states. “Moreover, instances of regulatory overreach and actions that bypass the Administrative Procedure Act introduce additional costs and uncertainty into credit markets that can further push lenders to retreat or limit offerings.
“As a result, the aggregate ‘dollars returned to consumers’ figure of $21 billion that is often cited by the CFPB severely understates the broader burden imposed on the financial system.”
Risk pricing vs. regulatory distortion
The ability-to-repay (ATR) rule — implemented under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act — requires lenders to verify a borrower’s ability to repay their mortgage.
Loans above a debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 43% are objectively riskier and were associated with higher default probabilities during the housing crisis of the late 2000s. Exceeding that threshold now means carrying an interest rate that’s roughly 16 basis points (bps) higher — a 4.3% relative increase — according to the report.
The CEA projects that “wedge” across credit markets, estimating $116 billion to $183 billion in mortgage costs, $32 billion to $51 billion for auto loans and $74 billion to $116 billion for credit cards.
But the identified pricing effect comes from a narrow subset of mortgages — primarily jumbo loans above the 43% DTI cutoff during a post-crisis regulatory transition.
“It appears that the CEA used the relative sizing of 4.3%, rather than the absolute size difference of 16 bps for its extrapolation,” Georgetown University law professor Adam Levitin wrote in a blog post about the report.
“That’s going to have the effect of goosing the impact when interest rates rise (as they did). I cannot be sure that CEA used the relative, rather than the absolute size because they didn’t show their work, but they come back to that 4.3% figure later, which makes me think that it is the number they used.
“Second, and this is the big issue, the CEA assumes that all of the difference in pricing is due to the CFPB’s regulation. But one would always expect higher rates for higher DTI mortgages — they are riskier all else being equal, and there’s no reason to think that rates would increase in linear fashion.”
Levitin’s identification of more accurate risk pricing rather than pure regulatory distortion is reinforced by widespread underwriting failures prior to 2008 that were documented by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.
Исследовать вкратце по Институт урбанизации‘s Housing Finance Policy Center shows improved delinquency outcomes after the implementation of the ATR rule compared with pre-crisis results.
“Additionally, CEA ignores that there is no secondary market for не-QM mortgages,” Levitin added. “In 2014, the FHFA directed Fannie and Freddie to purchase only QM loans or loans exempt from the ability-to-repay requirements. That’s what explains the much smaller volume of loans with DTIs >43%. Lenders do not want to be stuck with an inventory of risky loans.
“But the CEA is either unaware or purposefully ignores the effect of the FHFA directive, which would, of course, make it impossible to throw all of the blame at the CFPB.”
Transfers vs. true economic loss
The majority of the cumulative cost estimate reflects transfers — borrowers paying more interest to lenders.
In economic terms, transfers are redistributions, not deadweight losses. The report’s estimated deadweight loss — $1.5 billion to $5.7 billion — represents the perceived efficiency cost tied to fewer loan originations.
Guidance из Белый Дом Office of Management and Budget distinguishes between transfers and efficiency costs in federal regulatory analysis. Economists note that labeling transfers as “costs” can conflate redistribution with net welfare loss.
Funding structure, omitted benefits
The report calculates $8.9 billion in transfers from the Федеральный резерв к fund the CFPB and applies a 50% marginal excess tax burden — bringing the total fiscal cost to $13.3 billion.
Transfers from Federal Reserve earnings rather than annual congressional appropriations fund the CFPB, a structure that was upheld in 2024 by the Верховный суд in CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America.
Additionally, the CEA report does not quantify potential consumer and economic benefits such as reduced defaults, improved андеррайтинг standards or lower probability of systemic crises.
“There’s a glaring omission in this report,” Graciela Aponte-Diaz, vice president of the Center for Responsible Lending, said in a statement. “The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has saved Americans trillions of dollars by protecting them from financial exploitation and providing guardrails that keep predatory lenders from creating a repeat of the catastrophic 2008 Financial Crisis.
“Top U.S. banks posted record profits in 2024 — they’re doing just fine. Meanwhile, the CFPB has returned $21 billion directly to consumers over its history, exactly as it was designed to do. That work must continue, regardless of the administration’s repeated attempts to dismantle the agency.”
The 2008 financial crisis caused trillions of dollars in lost output and household wealth, according to estimates summarized by the Government Accountability Office.
As Aponte-Diaz pointed out, the CFPB reports $21 billion returned to consumers through enforcement actions targeting illegal credit card add-on products, mortgage servicing abuses and overdraft practices.
Transfers returned do not capture ongoing fee reductions, deterrence effects or industry practice changes — benefits that are more difficult to quantify.
While the CEA report provides a quantitative framework for assessing the CFPB’s economic impact and highlights significant potential costs to borrowers, its findings remain a subject of debate.
Critics argue the analysis relies on specific methodological assumptions, conflates financial transfers with net economic loss and omits broader benefits like increased market stability.
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